Introduction: Affective disorders are thought to be associated primarily with changes
described in detail a model that links the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) to bipolar disorders. Referring to the 'old' reinforcement sensitivity theory (see Corr, 2004) , BAS is thought to be one of two major neurobehavioral systems [besides the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS)], which are of high relevance for any motivated behaviour. BAS is hypothesized to specifically control appetitive motivation and reacts to signals of reinforcement or expectations of reward. It is assumed that positive affect such as hope, elation, and happiness are linked to BAS activation. In contrast, negative affect (e.g. feeling sad, being worried) is thought to be associated mainly with activation of the BIS. A high BAS sensitivity and BAS activation goes along with showing stronger goalorientation, stronger reactions to signals of reward and more positive affect (e.g. Depue & Iacono, 1989; Johnson et al., 2000) . Depue and Iacono (1989) postulated that extreme changes in BAS activity are responsible for the symptoms of an affective episode. For example: high levels of BAS activation lead to higher sensitivity to rewarding stimuli, and also increased seeking for pleasure and excitement. These are highly likely to be associated with positive affect. When positive affect increases, it can become euphoria which is one of the core symptoms of mania. Correspondingly, low levels of BAS activation would be a model for depression and characterized by anhedonia and low positive affect as has been suggested (e.g. Clark, Watson & Mineka, 1994; Depue & Iacono, 1993) .
Manic and depressive episodes can therefore be understood in this model as opposite manifestations of a single dimension, i.e. BAS activity and associated changes in positive affect (e.g. Clark et al., 1994; Joiner, Brown & Metalsky, 2003; Kasch, Rottenberg, Arnow & Gotlib, 2002; Watson, 2000) .
On the other hand, it is often assumed that bipolar disorder is characterized by stronger emotional reactions to both positive and negative stimuli, but more recent research seems to emphasize the role of positive affect and of reactivity to stimuli that are associated with reward or incentives (e.g. Hofmann & Meyer, 2006 : Lovejoy & Steuerwald, 1995 for review: Johnson, 2005) . There is also first evidence that stressful situations lead to a decrease of positive affect in patients with bipolar disorders and do not primarily involve changes in negative affect (e.g. Myin-Germeys et al., 2003) . Only one study reported also more negative affect in individuals at high risk for bipolar disorders by averaging daily mood ratings over a one month period (Hofmann & Meyer, 2006) , while other studies -looking at reactions to daily stressors or using different measures of negative affectivity (e.g. neuroticism) -do not find that people with bipolar disorder report more negative affect (e.g. Lozano & Johnson, 2001 ).
In conclusion, positive affect and changes in positive affect seems to be of more relevance for bipolarity than negative affect. Assuming a stronger reactivity with regard to positive affect in reaction to specific situations (e.g. Depue & Zald, 1993; Johnson, 2005) , our hypothesis was that individuals at risk for bipolar disorders will show stronger emotional reactions -especially in positive affect -to situations that involve reward. A study published in 1979 Stern and Berrenberg demonstrated that individuals at risk for mania reacted differently to success than people in the control group. They attributed success in a task they had to perform in the study more internally, stable and global than controls. Johnson, Ruggero and Carver (2005) used a GO-NOGO design to provide success feedback to students with current or former history of lifetime hypomanic symptoms. Individuals vulnerable for bipolar disorders tended to have higher expectations after success and also set higher goals. With regard to positive affect, they did not find evidence for a stronger increase in positive affect in at-risk people after success than in controls but Johnson et al. (2005) did, however, not control for the presence of major psychiatric disorders by clinical interviews. Furthermore they only used a global measure for positive affect, while different aspects of positive affect such as pride, joy or activation might show differential course and sensitivity (e.g. Egloff, Schmukle, Burns, Kohlmann & Hock, 2003) .
In summary, the goal of the study was to provide further evidence that there is a specific link between bipolar disorders and positive affect (and its dysregulation). We did so by testing the hypothesis that individuals at high risk for bipolar disorder will show stronger changes in positive (but not negative) affect to feedback of success than people who are not at risk. A further exploratory hypothesis was that the changes might be different for different facets of positive affect.
Method

Participants
One-hundred-and-twenty-nine students responded to advertisements posted around the university campus. The age range was 18 and 29 years. Complete data was provided by 107 students. They were all individually tested and were divided into a high risk-group for mania and a control group because of the scores in the Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS, Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) . To test a more homogeneous group and eliminate any potential gender-related confounds (e.g. rates in lifetime depression) we only included males. After assessment with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 12 participants were excluded (n = 8 Major Depression, n = 4 Bipolar Disorders). Another participant was excluded due to an unusual answering pattern (Infrequency scale). The remaining sample size therefore was n = 94. Median split is hardly ever used in this kind of research for several reasons, e.g. implicit threshold assumptions (e.g. Bentall, Tsai & Knowles, 2006;  Running title: Affect in people at risk …V 4.0 rev final 6 Depue & Zald, 1993 : Kwapil et al., 2000 : Meyer & Keller, 2003 . To have a reasonable number of high-risk individuals we chose as cut-offs scores for the risk group a HPS score of > 25 (HR: n = 16) and for the control group HPS < 21 (C: n = 56). The mean age of the risk group was 23.6 (+/-2.2), and mean age of control group was 24.3 (+/-2.7) not representing a significant difference, t (70) = 0.99, n.s.
Materials
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS, Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) . The HPS was used to define risk status. It is a self-rating scale consisting of 48 items with good psychometric properties (e.g. Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Meyer & Hofmann, 2005) .
Several studies have shown its validity and most compellingly shown evidence for predictive validity for bipolarity (e.g. Blechert & Meyer, 2005; Kwapil et al., 2000) . The
German version showed an internal consistency of .89 (Cronbachs α) and good retest correlation of r =.87 (2 years) (e.g. Hofmann & Meyer, 2006; Meyer, 2002) . (Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993) . Responses to the items are rated using a 4-point scale. The psychometric properties of the German and the American CES-D are comparable (e.g. Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993; Meyer & Hautzinger, 2003) .
We extended the short CES-D to simultaneously assess current hypomanic symptoms. With permission of Jules Angst (University of Zürich) we used the items of the Hypomania Checklist-32 (HCL-32, Angst et al., 2005) and rephrased them for assessment of current symptoms within the format of the CES-D. The HCL-32 items specifically address and include symptoms that have been selected and found valid in epidemiologic research.
Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM, Raven, Court, & Raven, 1980) . The socalled RAVEN test was chosen to give a faked success feedback to induce positive mood. Because the purpose was not primarily to have a reliable indicator for intelligence, we only used a subset of items of the APM with increasing difficulty levels. Guessing accurately the own performance was made impossible by using very difficult items and adding a time restraint of 15 minutes.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) The PANAS consists of 10 items for positive and another 10 items for negative affect using a 5-point scale for each item. The usefulness and validity of the PANAS has been repeatedly demonstrated (e.g. Lovejoy & Steuerwald, 1995; Watson, 2000) . We used the German translation of the PANAS (Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996) which shows sufficient reliability (Cronbach's α) of both positive (.85) and negative affect (.84). It also has been used in several studies (e.g. Meyer & Hofmann, 2005; Schmukle, Egloff, & Burns, 2002) . Recently, subscales were proposed for the positive affect dimension: joy (3 items. excited, proud, enthusiastic), interest (3 items: interested, strong, determined), and activation (4 items: alert, attentive, inspired, active) which are supposed to show different time courses (Egloff et al., 2003) .
Reliability for these subscales in the present study were sufficient and increased over time: activation: α t1 = .54, α t2 = .68, α t3 = .80, interest: α t1 = .44, α t2 = .56, α t3 = .66; joy: α t1 = .68, α t2 = .77, α t3 = .76.
Procedure
The participants signed an informed consent form but were totally debriefed after the session. In Figure 1 the study protocol is displayed. Before completing the mood measure PANAS (t1) for the first time the upcoming intelligence test was announced.
Then the short version of the Raven-Test was presented, and 15 minutes were provided to complete it. A second interviewer officially took the test; the participant was made belief that the test is scored by the second interviewer. Parallel the participant himself was asked to complete several questionnaires (including CES-D and the HPS). Afterwards the subject received faked success feedback that he "correctly solved 90 % tasks and therefore belongs to the top ten percent".
Afterwards the PANAS (t2) was completed a second time. This was followed by a dice task. They had 10 trials to get as many points as possible. The participants were not told that the three dices were manipulated so that '6' was the most likely outcome. After ten trials they were once again told about the 'performance' before they once again completed the PANAS (t3). At the end participants were interviewed using the short version of the SCID I.
Results
Although the success feedback was standardized for all participants, we tested if there were any differences in their performances to rule out the possibility of actual group differences account for expected differences in mood. The groups did not differ significantly in their scores for the Raven-test, i.e. the number of solved items, t (70) =0.23, n.s.. The same was true for the number of points reached in the 10 trials of the dice task, t (70) =0.22, n.s. (Table 1) . Although we excluded subjects with current or lifetime history of affective disorders, the risk group still displayed significant more subthreshold hypomanic symptoms than the control group, t (70) =-2,95, p < .01. A similar significant effect was found for depression as well, t (70) =-2.55, p < .05. These symptoms were, however, not significantly associated with performance in the Raven or dice task (-.07 < r < .08), and the performance in both tasks was not significantly correlated either (r = .15).
Age was significantly related to baseline ratings of negative affect (r = -.28, p < .01) but not positive affect (r = -.06). Of the subscales of positive affect, only 'joy' was significantly associated with age (r -.26, p < .01) but not 'interest' (r = .02) or 'activation' (r = .14)
Ratings of global positive (PA) and negative affect (NA) before and during the experimental session are displayed in Table 1 . To test for significant differences we conducted analysis of variance with repeated measurements separately for positive and negative affect (using Greenhouse-Geisser statistics). Looking at NA no interaction between group and time was expected and was not observed, F (1.73,120.88) = 1.27, n.s. There was no overall group effect for NA, F (1,70) = 0.01, n.s.. NA, however, generally decreased significantly over time, F (1.73,120.88) = 30.86, p < .001. This was primarily due to a drop from baseline scores compared to both later assessments, t1 to t2: t (71) = 8.31, p < ,001; t1 to t3: t (71) = 6.19, p < ,001; t2 to t3: t (71) = -.0.58, n.s. Because NA and age were correlated, we re-run the analysis of variance controlling for age did not change the results (results available on request from the authors).
For PA we found an overall group effect implying that the group at risk for bipolar disorders reported significantly more PA during the entire experiment than controls, F (1,70) = 5,65, p < .05. Contrary to our hypothesis, however, there was no interaction of group and time, F (1.92,134.08) = .03, n.s.. Receiving a very positive feedback about the Running title: Affect in people at risk …V 4.0 rev final 10 performance in an intelligence task obviously did not specifically increase PA in the risk group in general. On the contrary, we found a time effect suggesting a general linear decrease of PA over time in both groups, F (1.92,134.08) = 5,24, p <.01.
Conducting t-tests for dependent samples, it became obvious that PA did not change from baseline to feedback of success, t (71) = 0.06, n.s., but decreased from baseline to the end of the session, t (71) = 3.02, p < .005, as well as from the feedback of success to the end, t (71) = 3.68, p < .001.
The PA dimension can be divided into interest, activation, and joy (see Egloff et al., 2003) . In Table 2 the relevant scores are displayed (see also Figure 2 ). Looking first at 'interest', there was a main group effect, F (2,70) = 6.06, p <.05, implicating that the risk group generally reported more interest. 'Interest' varied, however, not as a function of group status and time, F (1.83,128.07) = 0,01, n.s., but clearly showed a linear decrease from the start to the end of the experiment, F (1.83,128.07) = 21.77, p < .001. 'Interest' decreased over time in almost perfect linear way, i.e. t1 to t2: t (71) = 3.61, p < ,001; t1 to t3: t (71) = 7.43, p < ,001; t2 to t3: t (71) = 4.94, p < ,001.
The facet 'activation' was not significantly affected by group status, F (1, 70) = 1,21, n.s., i.e. high-risk individuals did not generally describe their current state as more or less alert, attentive, inspired or active. There was also no interaction of group and time, F (1.88, 131.42) = 0.04, n.s., that would imply that the feedback of success did affect the groups differently, but once again 'activation' similar to 'interest' decreased over time, although this was less pronounced and just failed significance, F (1.83,128.07) = 3.05, p = .054. Looking more closely, 'activation' did not significantly change from baseline to the feedback of success in the intelligence task, t1 to t2: t (71) = 1.18, n.s., but decreased specifically compared to the last assessment, t2 to t3: t (71) = 2.71, p < .005; t1 to t3: t (71) = 2.08, p < .05.
Referring to 'joy' the individuals at risk for bipolar disorder overall reported having more fun than the control group, F (1,70) = 4.71, p < .05. Once again, there was no significant interaction of group and time, F (1.93, 135.20) = 0.22, n.s., but an effect of time, F (1.93, 135.20) = 3.84, p < .05, which was not linear. Because 'joy' and age were correlated, we also re-run this analysis of variance controlling for age which only change the effect of risk group slightly turning it into a trend, F (1,69) = 3.64, p = .06 (results available on request from the authors).
Looking more closely at the time effect for 'joy' it became evident that the feedback of success had its effect because joy increased from baseline to success feedback for the intelligence test, t1 to t2: t (71) = -3.44, p < .001, and decreased afterwards again; t2 to t3: t (71) = 2.43, p < .05; t1 to t3: t (71) = -.1.50, n.s. Independently of group status the positive feedback obviously had some effect on the participants with an increase in joy associated with the performance feedback. The dice task, however, did not lead to maintaining joy.
Discussion
If the dysregulation of the BAS is a core vulnerability factor for bipolar disorders, goal attainment and success indicators -if true or imagined -can be triggers for mania-like symptoms in vulnerable people (e.g. Depue & Iacono, 1989; Johnson, 2005) . We therefore hypothesized that a positive feedback about the performance in an intelligence test will specifically affect positive mood but not negative affect in people at risk for bipolar disorders, because positive affect is considered the main dimension for depression and mania (e.g. Clark et al., 1994 : Johnson, 2005 . Except for a general decrease of negative affect over time we did not find evidence that it is differently related to risk status. This is in line with other research (e.g. Myin-Germeys et al., 2003) . Looking at positive affect, we found that individuals hypothesized to be at risk for bipolar disorders reported generally more positive affect but did not react more positively to a success feedback. More specifically -if one looks at the facets of positive affect (e.g. Egloff et al., 2003) -the general higher rating in positive affect of at-risk individuals can be mainly attributed to reporting more interest and a trend towards more joy, but not more activation. Nevertheless, no differential response in these facets of positive affect was observed specifically for high-risk individuals. One might question if the feedback of success did work, but we found evidence in one facet of positive affect that our manipulation did work, namely in "joy".
When looking at mood, the overall higher level of reported positive affect by at-risk individuals is not surprising and is in line with other reports (e.g. Lovejoy & Steuerwald, 1995; Meyer & Hofmann, 2005) . This is, however, the first study taking into account different facets of positive affect. Differences in activation are discussed as core factor in affective disorders (e.g. Benazzi & Akiskal, 2003 : Depue & Zald, 1993 Johnson, 2005; Meyer & Krumm-Merabet, 2003) , therefore it was somewhat unexpected that individuals at risk only reported more joy and interest, but not higher activation. Before questioning if 'activation' is of relevance, at least two things should be considered. First of all, the items that constitute the 'activation' subscale (i.e. attentive, alert) might not be totally capturing what is associated with activation e.g. motivated, energized, or even restless. Second, this subscale with four items has a potential range of sum scores between 0 and 12. At the beginning of the experiment the average score was 9.81 and 9.21 respectively, so that a ceiling effect might have happened.
Why did we not find specific stronger positive emotional reactions in at-risk people? One possible explanation is that the hypothesis of stronger reactivity with regard to positive affect is wrong. Although we cannot rule out this possibility it seems unlikely if one takes into account prior research (e.g. Hofmann & Meyer, 2006; Johnson, Ruggero & Carver, 2005; Lovejoy & Steuerwald, 1995) . Several other reasons might have contributed to this. One explanation could be that the success feedback did not work. However, as mentioned before 'joy' increased after having received a positive test result. Nevertheless personal importance and relevance of the test result might differ between individuals, and stronger emotional reactions are to be expected for highly valued goals or personal relevant areas. Unfortunately we did not systematically assess and quantify the observer perspective of the participants' emotional reactions because the spontaneous reactions seemed to have been sometimes more intense than the emotions reflected in the PANAS. Last but not least, the PANAS in its present form might not be the most adequate instrument to sensitively assess changes. The selection process of items for PA and NA might have eliminated facets of affect that are more easily affected by specific situations (e.g. Fahrenberg, 2006) . In addition to this general problem of sensitivity of mood ratings to changes, Johnson, Gruber and Eisner (2007) point out that we might face another problem within the field of bipolar disorders probably due to problems in measuring subjective affect in a population that is defined by experiences of extreme mood states.
Before drawing final conclusions some limitations should be kept in mind. First, we restricted the sample to a merely male university student population which on one hand restricts generalizing the results but also eliminates some alternative explanations such as differences in education or sex. Second, because of our exclusion criteria the sample size became rather small and the cut-offs for the groups had to be adjusted. Nevertheless the risk status was associated with higher subthreshold depressive and hypomanic symptoms, i.e. confirming that the lower cutoff still identified people with more mood symptoms. Furthermore there is evidence that a dimensional model of risk for mania is appropriate and could perhaps replace a categorical approach (e.g. Angst et al., 2003; Meads & Bentall, 2008; Meyer & Keller, 2003) . Nevertheless replications in larger samples seem recommended.
In conclusion, we were able to replicate the overall higher positive affect in individuals at risk for bipolar disorders, but did not find evidence for stronger reactivity with regard to positive affect. Breaking down the concept of positive affect and looking more specifically at facets of positive affect might be very promising because it became evident that different aspects of positive affect varied differently over time and might be differently affected by the same situations. Therefore this should be taken into account when patient and non-patient samples are tested. A similar differentiated look with regard to negative affect (e.g. frustration, irritability, sadness, anxiety) could be of theoretical relevance as well for the understanding of emotional experience and regulation in bipolar disorder. Watson, D., Clark, L.A., & Tellegen, A. (1988 (Angst et al., 2005; Radloff, 1977) . SD = standard deviation, SE = standard error (based on repeated measurement estimates) 
